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LEGAL DECISIONMAKING AS A RESPONSIBLE
INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY:
A CONTINENTAL POINT OF VIEW
Marijan Pav~nik*
Abstract: The legal decision in a concrete case is never completely given in advance in
the statute. A theory of legal decisionmaking that sees the decider as someone who merely
"applies the law" is inadequate to explain what goes on in the process of legal
decisionmaking. The legal decision is a value synthesis assessing the normative starting
point with regard to the factual starting point, and vice versa. This means that a legal
decision can only be made when the normative state of constituent facts of the case has been
formed on the basis of the statute, when from the life case the legally-relevant state of facts
has been worked out, and when it has been established that the latter is an example of the
normative state of constituent facts to which a certain legal consequence is linked. The
theory of argumentation described in this essay examines the nature of the process of legal
deciding as such, and offers to legal decisionmakers an appropriate methodology for
understanding their own actions, and for filling up the ambiguous space between norm and
facts with arguments that will make the decision legally persuasive, if not legally secure. But
beyond a prescription for rhetorical effectiveness, the theory of argumentation shows that
above all legal decisionmaking is a responsible intellectual activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dialectical reasoning, which was an object of philosophical treatment
in the ancient world and in medieval scholasticism,' is also today at the
center of European thought concerning the theory of argumentation in
law. As Valentin Kalan puts it, dialectical reasoning "takes place on the
basis of probable statements, the criterion of the truth or untruth of a
statement being its acceptability or unacceptability." 2 The acceptability or
unacceptability of the premises and of the resulting conclusion is the
characteristic that differentiates dialectical from analytical reasoning: the
premises of analytical reasoning are inevitable or at least irrefutably true,
and thus the conclusion-if the valid path of formal-logical inference is
* Dr. and Professor of Law, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Law, 1000 Ljubljana, Kongresni
trg 12, Slovenia. The text of this essay is based on the author's monograph, Argumentacija vpravu
(1991), and on its German counterpart, Juristisches Verstehen undEntscheiden (1993).
1. See Michel Villey, La raisonnementjuridique dans l'histoire: . Droit romain et moyen-Sge,
1972 Die Juristische Argumentation 43; Theodor Viehweg, Historische Perspektiven der
juristischen Argumentation, 1972 Die Juristische Argumentation 63.
2. Valentin Kalan, Dialektika in metafizikapriAristotelu 52 (1981).
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followed-is also inevitably true.3 In dialectical reasoning, however, the
transition from the premises to the conclusion is not inevitable. That is to
say, dialectical reasoning permits the possibility of different decisions,
and thus it can be said to mark off an area of freedom in legal
decisionmaking.4
It is evident from these starting points that the field of argumentation
in law lies between two limitations or extremes. At one extreme, there is
no room for interpretation when "the assertion we make is obvious and
its clearness is evident to any careful spirit."' In such a case "the truth
imposes itself in a obligatory manner," and the decision's "obviousness" is
such that it is experienced by the decisionmaker as leaving no freedom of
choice. At the other extreme lies the wholly unconstrained decision. In
the words of ChaYm Perelman, this sort of decision "takes place where
the assertion is made arbitrarily, without giving any arguments on its
behalf, and subordination to an authority is required, which imposes itself
with rude force and without trying to achieve the agreement of the
spirit."6 It is between these two poles-absolute constraint and absolute
freedom-that the field of argumentation lies.
Although the theory of argumentation refers to an area of freedom in
decisionmaking that is constrained only by what is considered
acceptable or unacceptable to the audience of the decision, this does not
mean that it denies the importance of formal logic in general and of
syllogistic inference in particular. It only means that the central
preoccupation of the theory of argumentation is how rationally to ground
the value side of legal decisionmaking and how to fornu persuasively
both premises within a framework that makes possible the decision as a
distinctly legal outcome. Only when this point is achieved can the result
of legal decisionmaking be translated into the symbolism characteristic
of formal logic-that is, into an instance of the so.-called "legal"
syllogism.
3. See Chalm Perelman, Logique Juridique: Nouvelle rhgtorique, in Mithodes du Droit 1 (Jean
Carbonnier ed., 1976).
4. See I d at 2.
5. ChaYm Perelman, Recht undRhetorik, in Rhetorische Rechtstheorie 237, 237 (Ottmar Ballweg
& Thomas-Michael Seibert eds., 1982).
6. Id
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II. ELEMENTS OF THE NORMATIVE CONCRETIZATION OF
THE STATUTE
This section investigates the dialectical process of legal
decisiomaking by means of a model that is held up, in subsequent
sections, for theoretical investigation and justification. The essential idea
is that legal decisionmaking is the process by which the facts of the case
enter into a conversation, as it were, with the statute-a conversation
that takes the form of a series of acts of valuation by a human
decisionmaker. The flesh-and-blood decisionmaker can then be seen as
standing at the center of the process, as being the real agent by which the
law is always made concrete.
A legal decision is possible when, on the basis of the statute, the
normative state of constituent elements of the case has been formed;7
when, from the particular case at hand (here called the "life case"), the
legally-relevant state of facts8 has been worked out; when it has been
established that the latter is an example of the normative state of
constituent facts to which a certain legal consequence is linked; and
when, finally, the legal consequence is put into concrete terms. Figure 1
gives a graphic depiction of the various stages just described.9
7. Tatbestand, in German. In this essay the Tatbestand will be called the "normative state" or the
"normative constituent elements of the case."
8. Sachverhalt, in German. In this essay, the Sachverhalt will be called the "factual state" or the
"relevant factual elements."
9. Cf Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 261 (5th ed. 1983); Marijan Pav~nik,
Argumentacya vpravu 27 (1991); GUnther Winkler, Sein und Sollen, 10 Rechtstheorie 257, 275
(1979).
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Figure 1
Legend: NCE=normative constituent elements (for example, insult or even more definitely,
elements of insult); RFE=relevant factual elements (for example, A's slap across B's face-
an action corresponding to the elements of insult); LC=legal consequence (for example, a
pecuniary fine).
The distance between the normative and the factual state is always
such that their contents are never identical. There is only a
correspondence between them, because the normative starting point of
deciding (the example used in Figure 1 is the concept of "insult" with
legal consequence),"0 as well as the life case, are both open as to their
contents. Their meaning is not defined only on the basis of themselves:
the connection between them is based on a legal valuation that fills up
the space between them-a space that is open as to iis meaning (for
example, the space of what is an insult and which concrete facts amount
to an insult). It lies in the nature of the legal phenomenon that this
valuation is based on the perception of an analogy between the factual
state and the normative state. Just as the typical elements of the
normative state issue from life cases that are similar to each other, so too
the subsumption of the relevant factual state to the normative one
consists in the discovery that the elements of the factual state correspond
10. The criminal offense and civil wrong of "insult" is discussed infra text accompanying notes
27-28.
statute
valuation NCE LC
/-7RFE=NCE(RFEis an example of NCE)
REE > LC
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(are analogous) to those elements of the normative state that are taken to
be typical.11
The content of the legally-relevant factual state and its elements do
not issue from the life case as such. The life case is only a slice of social
reality-it is something that took place in history, at a particular place
and time. Which facts are legally relevant and, as such, represent
elements of the relevant factual state, only issues from a concrete
comparison between the established facts that form the life case and the
corresponding normative state of constituent facts. To put it another
way, the relevant factual state is established by means of a valuation of
the facts of the life case. That is, the relevant factual state consists in
those facts that at the concrete level are taken to represent a counterpart
of the elements that make up the normative state.
The concept "normative state of constituent facts of the case with
legal consequence" consists in that part of the general and abstract legal
norm that is designated as the primary hypothesis (the prerequisite of the
primary disposition) or as the secondary hypothesis (the legal violation
which is the prerequisite of the sanction). In the first case the normative
state corresponds to the primary hypothesis (the prerequisite). The
primary hypothesis defines in advance the constituent facts (elements) of
the case, wherein the legal subject is seen as the holder of a legal
"right," 2 or as the bearer of a legal "duty."'3 Thus the basic entitlement
and the duty are legal consequences that are linked to the predefined
normative state of facts to which they correspond.
In this connection it is worthwhile to note that there is an important
asymmetry between a right and a duty. A concrete right does not come
into being automatically because whether the normative entitlement will
be realized always depends on the will of the entitled subject. 4 In the
case of a legal duty, however, the concerned legal subject does not
enjoy, as an entitlement, the possibility of a unilateral forbearance to
exercise her duty: as soon as real facts appear, which are also a case of
11. See generally Aristotle, Nikomachisehe Ethik I, 4, 1096b; V, 6, 1131a (4th ed. 1985); Josef
Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts 231 (1956); Arthur
Kaufinann, Analogie und "Natur der Sache" (2d ed. 1982); Patrick Nerhot, Legal Knowledge and
Meaning. The Example of Legal Analogy, in Legal Knowledge and Analogy: Fragments of Legal
Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Linguistics 183, 183-97 (Patrick Nerhot ed., 1991); Francesco
Romeo, Analogie: Zu einem relationalen Wahrheitsbegriff im Recht (1991); Boris Furlan, Teorija
pravnega sklepanja, 10 Zbomik znanstvenih razprav 29 (1933-1934).
12 "Right" is used here in the sense of a basic entitlement: Berechtigung, in German.
13. "Duty" is used here in the sense of a primary obligation: Verpflichtung, in German.
14. That is, people do not always "stand on their rights."
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the predefined normative state (the primary hypothesis), then also the
duty binding the legal subject appears. Thereafter, the legal subject must
concretize and realize the duty: if she acts in a different manner or
remains passive, this is already a legal violation as to which an
appropriate sanction can follow without regard to her will.
This so-called "legal violation" with a legal consequence is another
case of correspondence to the normative state of constituent elements
coupled with its legal consequence: if real facts appear, which are
predefimed in a normative manner as signs or elements of a legal
violation (the secondary hypothesis), then the sanction (concrete legal
consequence) should be activated. In this case the legal violation comes
out in the definition of the conduct that conflicts with the main element
of the legal norm (the primary disposition).
It is of prime importance for legal decisionmaking in concrete cases
that the normative state of constituent elements with legal consequence
is not completely given in advance. The normative state is only the
result of work: of the decider's engagement with a statute that is
accessible to the interpreter in the first instance only as a complex of
linguistic signs. These signs need to be understood. In this context the
normative state should by no means be conflated with this or that legal
provision (prescription, paragraph, article, etcetera). Even when they
partly or completely overlap, this is only a seeming correspondence as to
contents. For the very least that a decisionmaker must do is make sense
of the linguistic signs as being the normative state that they are, and
thereby exclude the possibility that other interpretations are more
appropriate, justified, or adequate.
III. THREE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LEGAL
DECISIONMAKING
A number of theories have attempted to justify legal decisionmaking
in concrete cases." In this section, I focus on three such theories: the
classical doctrine of conceptual jurisprudence, the theory of law-
graduality, and the concept of the normative concretization of the
statute. This brief survey does not aim at completeness, but is meant to
15. See generally Larenz, supra note 9; Ulfrid Neumann, Juristische Argumentationslehre
(1986); Marijan Pavdnik uristisches erstehen undEntscheiden 130 (1993); Perelman,supra, note
3.
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draw attention to the problem that the theory of argumentation takes as
its special task to address.'6
A. Legal Decisionmaking as the "Application ofLaw"
For the doctrine of conceptual jurisprudence, "application of law"
consists in merely the transfer of a content (of the statute) to a concrete
case. This transfer deduces the content of the legal decision from law
conceived as a closed and dogmatically-formed system. It is of decisive
importance that this inference is taken to be from an independent and
self-contained legal system. The legal-dogmatical treatment of the
statute, the analysis of its contents, and the scientific system 7 that is
based on this conceptual analysis all offer the promise of conceptual
clarity and normative direction. It is one of the advantages of conceptual
jurisprudence that it seems to provide legal decisionmaking with the
necessary certainty and security. Quite apart from this, however, it is
only on the basis of something like conceptual jurisprudence that it is
possible to establish the conceptual framework wherein the legal
decision is placed. To this extent, it can be said that conceptual
jurisprudence is an unavoidable concomitant of decisionmaking in
concrete cases. But its role becomes questionable and perverted when
the "cult of the logical" breaks loose, and legal concepts begin to take on
the objectified aspect of a "direct reality."'8 Thus, the weak point of
conceptual jurisprudence lies not in its conceptual filigree, but simply in
the fact that as legal science it is alienated from the social, political, and
moral reality of law. 9 This also makes it ideological, for it gives the
impression that the legal decision is merely a mechanical reproduction
of a set of entities that reside in the realm of a conceptual "reality."
16. For discussions of the same problem, see generally Aulis Aamio, The Rational as
Reasonable: A Treatise on Legal Justification (1987); Robert Alexy, Theorie der juristischen
Argumentation (1983); Karl Engisch, Einfiihrung in dasjuristische Denken (7th ed. 1977); Esser,
supra note 11; 3, 4 Wolfgang Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts (1976); Kaufmann, supra note 11;
Hans-Joachim Koch & Helmut Rilssmann, Juristische Begrandungslehre (1982); Martin Kriele,
Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung (2d ed. 1976); Larenz, supra note 9; Neil MacCormick, Legal
Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978); Friedrich Miller, Juristische Methodik (3d ed. 1989);
Aleksander Peczenik, Grundlagen derjuristischen Argumentation (1983); Perelman, supra note 3;
Theodor Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz (5th ed. 1974); Grinther Winkler, Rechtstheorie und
Erkenntnislehre (1990); Jerzy Wr6blewski, The Judicial Application of Law (Zenon Bankowski &
Neil MacCormick eds., 1992).
17. The system, for example, could be the civil law as a whole or the component parts thereof.
18. This defect in conceptual jurisprudence is discussed very ably in Franz Wieacker,
Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit 433 (2d ed. 1967).
19. Seeid at401.
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Unfortunately, the sediments of the pure theory of "application of
law" are still very much with us. They are maintained by any legal
theory which is satisfied with merely conceptual exegesis of valid
formal legal sources. The object of conceptual jurisprudence is "law in
the books" and not "law in action." It is obsessed with the linguistic,
logical, and systematic analysis of the legal text as such, which is
studied for its meaning irrespective of its functional context. Mechanical
"application of law" radically stretches the significance of the statute to
the life cases that require legal decisions: the statute is accepted as a
complex of univocal and self-contained types of conduct that as such can
be "transferred" to social life. Life cases, in turn, are conflated and then
equated with legally-relevant states of facts that inertly wait to be taken
up by a legal decisionmaker who is conceived as an automaton, whose
only job is to subsume the facts under the statute.
Consciously or unconsciously, the classical conception is based on
the hypothesis that the "application of law" is always posterior to law:
that it is a mechanical action that merely reproduces law in a concrete
social relation. This conception is characteristic both of classical natural
law theory and of classical normative legal positivism: both forms of
thought see the realization of law as unhistorical, as a "process in which
nothing happens. The case and the statute remain as they were before,
and nothing changes." 2°
B. Legal Decisionmaking as an Element ofLaw-Graduality
Legal decisionmaking in concrete cases cannot overlook the gradual
structure of law. In this century, this old finding has experienced a
theoretical reincarnation in the theory of graduality of legal norms,
especially in Kelsen's pure theory of law.2 It is of capital importance for
20. Arthur Kaufmann, Voriberlegungen zu einer juristischen Logik und Ontologie der
Relationen, 17 Rechtstheorie 257, 259-60 (1986) (emphasis added).
21. It has been said that Hans Kelsen, who came to the United States as a refugee from Nazism
in 1940, was the most influential legal theorist outside the English-speaking world. Martin
Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century Americg-Major Themes and
Developments, 36 J. Legal Educ. 441, 447 (1986). See generally Hans Kelsm, General Theory of
Law and State (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945). Without discussing Kelsen's "pure theory of law" in
detail, it can be said briefly that the theory's objective is knowledge of that which is essential to
law, conceived as a normative science. Although law in Kelsen's theory concerns itself with the
"ought," as opposed to the "is," law as a normative science means knowing tfae norm, including the
highest basic norm (Grundnorm) on which all other norms are based. The function of the basic
norm:
to confer law-creating power on the act of the first legislator and on all the other acts based on
the first act. To interpret these acts of human beings as legal acts and their products as binding
488
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legal deciding in concrete cases that the creator of the legal act (say, a
judgment) moves within a certain normative framework that is neither
completely certain nor completely uncertain. The relative certainty and
uncertainty of this framework enables the decisionmaker to act in a
manner that is creative, or at least jointly creative. This framework can
be uncertain either methodically or unintentionally; for example, its
uncertainty may come from an ambiguity of words, from a lack of
accordance between the will and its external expression, or from a
conflict of two or more legal norms. In the present case it is of primary
importance that the linguistic meaning of the legal norm is not univocal:
the applier of law moves within a linguistic framework that allows
several possibilities for the application of the norm.22
To conceive of the legal norm as a semantic framework out of which
the legal decision in a concrete case emerges is to achieve an important
insight into the nature of legal decisionmaking. Hans Kelsen, for
example, does not consider this framework as fixed and absolute, as
does the doctrine of conceptual jurisprudence. For him legal concepts
are not productive in themselves, but the legal norm makes a framework
that must be creatively filled up by the application of the law to a case.
In the theory of law-graduality the legal decisionmaker is no longer seen
as just a viva vox legis who mechanically reproduces the statute--the
norms, and that means to interpret the empirical material which presents itself as law as such,
is possible only on the condition that the basic norm is presupposed as a valid norm. The basic
norm is only the necessary presupposition of any positivistic interpretation of the legal
material.
lit at 116.
For Kelsen, because law is created or annulled by human beings, it is "positive" only under the
condition that the total legal order is efficacious. The efficacy of the legal order is "a condition, not
the reason for the validity of its constituent norms. These norms are valid not because the total
order is efficacious, but because they are created in a constitutional way." Id at 119. The task of
legal science is to elucidate the various relations that hold between legal norms, but not to evaluate
the ethical or moral status of the norms: "A science has to describe its object as it actually is, not to
prescribe how it should be or should not be from the point of view of some specific value
judgments." Id at xiv. Thus, for example, "law-graduality" in Kelsen's theory refers to the way in
which a lower-level legal norm is built on the basis of a higher-level norm, which in turn is built on
the basis of a still higher one, and so on, until at last, the level of the Grundnorm is reached. In
short, all these "legal norms belong to one and the same legal order because their validity can be
traced back-directly or indirectly-to the first constitution. That the first constitution is a binding
legal norm is presupposed, and the formulation of the presupposition is the basic norm of this legal
order." Id at 115. The original author of the theory of law-graduality is Adolf Merkl. See Adolf
Merkl, Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues 252 (193 1); cf Robert Walter, Der
AuJbau derRechtsordnung 53 (2d ed. 1974).
22. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechslehre 228,240-41,348-49 (1983).
23. "Living voice of the Law."
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normative starting point of deciding-in the manner of a "subsumption
automaton"; now the decisionmaker steps forth into the light and is seen
as a creator who jointly shapes the legal decision in a concrete case. But
although the theory of law-graduality is an advance over purely
conceptual jurisprudence, it still remains fixated on the normative
structure, which is onlypart of the legal reality of decisionmaking.
C. The Theory of the Normative Concretization of the S!tatute
The theory of the normative concretization of the statute gives to the
process of "application of law" (that is, legal deciding in concrete cases)
the meaning of a historical event with definite coordinates of time and
place. As such, what deciding decides-the legal decision as such-is a
value synthesis when it creates the normative state of constituent
elements out of normative materials and when, on the basis of the
factual starting point, it shapes the legally-relevant state of facts that
corresponds to the normative one. The relative creativity of the decision
depends on the extent of ambiguity exhibited by the normative starting
point and the life case. Within this scope, the legal decision can be
creative; but it also can be obstructive and uncreative if it shapes
normative and/or factual states that differ from "accepted" types and
standards of conduct.
This area of human production of law is entered intc directly by the
theory of argumentation in law, which rejects legal decisionism as well
as legal determinism. It rejects the former because decisionism
overlooks the statute and claims the absolute significance of the life
case; that is, because it views the legal decision as a pure act of will. It
rejects the latter because determinism claims the absolute significance of
the statute and neglects the significance of the life case as the factual
starting point of deciding; that is, because it claims that the only right
legal decision is something that is completely given in advance in the
statute. The theory of the normative concretization of the statute (as one
of the theories of argumentation) also accepts an "intermediate"
solution: the legal decision consists neither in a pure application of the
statute, nor in the applier's arbitrary will; rather, it is a rationally
justifiable decision in spite of the greater or smaller openness of the
statute and the life case as to their contents.24
24. See, e.g., MacCormick, supra note 16, at 265-74; Neumann, supra note 15, at 2-3; Pavenik,
supra note 15, at 7, 130.
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To put it even more definitely, the starting point of the theory of
argumentation is recognized legality and not a desire to extend the scope
of the legal actor's possibilities. The theory of argumentation takes as its
object the multihued shades of meaning present in legal deciding, and it
offers legal decisionmakers a suitable methodology that enables them to
give meaning to their actions. The concept of the normative
concretization of the statute is not unique to the theory of
argumentation,' but its unique ambition is to deal with legal criteria and
arguments that can improve the legal determinability and predictability
of the actions of legal decisionmakers.
IV. LEGAL-THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NORMATIVE CONCRETIZATION OF THE STATUTE
A. Normative Concretization of the Statute Instead ofLaw-Graduality
The theory of law-graduality is correct in recognizing that a lower
legal stage represents a normative concretization of a higher one.
Although the center of attention of the Merkl-Kelsen theory of law-
graduality is the normative framework as such, the process of normative
concretization of the statute involves the legal reality as a whole, of
which the normative structure is only a part. Figure 2 represents legal
reality as a dialectic between the social reality in which decisionmakers
are embedded and the normative framework within which they find
themselves in their capacity as legal decisionmakers.26
25. For an analogous use in international research, see Zenon Bankowski et al., On Method and
Methodology, in Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study 9 (Neil MacCormick & Robert
Summers eds., 1991). See also Robert S. Summers & Michele Tarufo, Interpretation and
Comparative Analysis, in MacCormick & Summers, supra, at 461.
26. For a similar treatment, see Winkler, supra note 9, at 275 and Pavdnik, supra note 9, at 27.
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Figure 2
valuation
SR C C C
SR N S S
SR J__ _ _ _ _ _
SR >MA MA MA
Legend: SR=social reality; C=constitution (the constitutional legal norm that interpretation
takes out of the constitution as a linguistic document); S=statute (more definitely, the
statutory legal norm that interpretation takes out of the statute as a lingaistic document);
J=judgment; MA-material act (for example, repayment of the loan, payment of damages).
Figure 2 shows the sense in which the legal decision itself is never
completely given in advance. What are given in advance are only the
elements-in a more or less "raw" state-on the basis of which the
decision in a concrete case is built. This means that the legal decision is
neither the result of the statute, nor is it judge-made law; neither the
simple product of a conflict of interests, nor the consequence of a
conceptually smooth normative system; neither the outgrowth of the
"case system," nor that of a normative approach; neither a manifestation
of the method of "problem-solving," nor the outcome of systematic
thinking. The legal decision is at bottom an evaluative synthesis: it
values the particular conflict of interests immanent in the life case in
light of the statute, and interprets the statute in light of the conflict of
interests. This dialectical treatment is always problematic, yet at the
same time is always inserted into the legal system. It leans either on
Vol. 72:481, 1997
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judicial precedents (characteristic cases) or on the usual rhetorical tools
of the system, or on both of these, until at last the relevant factual state
grows out of the life case and the normative state of facts grows out of
the statute.
B. The Significance ofIndividual and Historically Unrepeatable Life
Cases
The starting point of a lawyer's work is the life case-that which the
lawyer must endow with legal meaning. For example, the starting point
might be a case in which A slapped B's face with a book, such that B fell
to the ground. Which elements of this life case can be considered also
elements of the legally-relevant state of facts will depend upon the
circumstances of the slap, on its intensity, on the nature of the
consequences to B, on the physical characteristics of the book, on the
location of the slap, and so forth. For example, it may be especially
controversial how to evaluate the slap (is it merely a light bodily injury
or is it an "insult"?), or how to evaluate A's use of the book (is it merely
a harmless object or is it a dangerous instrument?). Moreover, what is
included in the legal concept of "insult"? What are the legal dimensions
of a "light bodily injury," as opposed to an "insult"? How is one to
define the "dangerous instrument that may seriously injure the body"?
And so forth.27
This means that the life case is only the factual starting point of legal
deciding-one could say that it is the factual state in statu nascendi.28 In
social reality, life cases continuously occur, and no two of them are ever
completely identical to one another. This is what it means to say that
each life case is "open as to its meaning." As a historical event it is
never self-evidently relevant, for by itself the life case is only a
"shapeless factual state of affairs," '29 from which the legal decisionmaker
must extract the elements that constitute it as (in the form of) a legally-
relevant state of facts.
Of course, many special questions are raised by fact-finding in legal
practice, including those that cluster within the framework of norms
known as the law of evidence, and even within the norms of legal
27. See, e.g., Slovn. Crim. Code arts. 133, 169, reprinted in 63 Official Gazette of Slovenia
(1994).
28. "In the condition of being bom." See Joachim Hruschka, Die Konstitution des Rechisfalles
12(1965).
29. Larenz, supra note 9, at 267.
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equality and due process of law.3" But the question of how facts are
proved in court should not be confused with the observation that the life
case as a historical event is the factual starting point for the legal
decisionmaker. That is, the life case as a factual event is prior to the
"facts of the case" in the legal sense, for the latter always gets formed as
the relevant factual state out of the raw material of the life case.
C. Interpretation as a Value (Re)construction of the Legal Norm
It is a matter of convention whether every understanding of a statute
is called an "interpretation," or whether this term is used. only when the
meaning of the linguistic signs of a statute are defined by means of a
special interpretive procedure. It is more important whether the
interpretation of the statute is taken to be just a "reconstruction of the
thought inherent therein, 3' which reconstruction is then "applied" to a
concrete case. In the process of normative concretization, the legally-
relevant type of conduct is determined in view of the already existing
life case, which is unique and cannot be repeated. The uniqueness and
unrepeatability-in a word, the individuality--of the life case confronts
the types, moulds, and patterns of conduct that are communicated by the
legislator by means of the statute. These latter descriptions are left
deliberately open as to their contents. That is, in this context "openness
with regard to meaning" does not signify a condition that is merely a
consequence of a text that cannot avoid ambiguity; rather, the concept of
openness as to meaning here names something that lies in the essence of
modem law itself. A statute always equalizes anticipated cases by means
of typical (and therefore abstract and general) elements, and therefore
foresees as equal what in reality always occurs as a concrete and
unrepeatable act. In a nutshell: modem law, at the level of the statute, is
read to apply to an open set of possible life cases, and not to this or that
particular life case. A statute that is not general and abstract in this
sense is the antithesis of the modem conception of the "Rule of Law."
30. It is an uncontroversial aspect of "equal protection" and "due process" of law that the
legality of factual demonstration requires that both parties involved in the life case and interested in
the solution of the dispute have, at least formally, the same possibilities when demonstrating what
has happened. If one of the parties is either privileged or, on the other hand, barred from presenting
evidence "confirming" his view of the life case, or reversing, amending, or supplementing the view
of the opposing party, then it is possible to say that this is not a demonstration according to the
principle of legal equality. See generally Twinning et al., Reasoning on facts, in 2 Legal Reasoning
419, 421-87 (Aulis Aamio & Neil MacCormick eds., 1992); Hruschka, supra note 28;
Wr6blewski, supra note 16, at 131-88.
31. Friedrich Karl von Savigny, System des heutigen Rdmischen Rechts 213 (1840).
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That is, it resides at the level of the arbitrary command-for example,
the command that this man be executed, or that this woman be deprived
of her property.
The opposite poles of life case and statute require a legal decision, a
synthesis, in order to realize the concept of a statute that is applied; yet
neither of them can be defined out of themselves, nor can they
completely lean upon one other, because both of them are at least partly
open as to their contents. Thus the interpretation of the statute is also a
value construction, a final shaping of the "thought" that must lead to the
legal decision.32 The interpretive process no longer is seen to consist in
just finding out the content-the sense and aim-of the legal norm that
is contained in the statute completely and in advance. Now the legal
norm is seen to be the result of the way in which the decisionmaker
understands the statute, and of the interpretive procedure wherein the
legal norm communicated by the legislator is (re)constructed.
Thus, in the context of the normative concretization of the statute, the
term "statute" is not synonymous with law that can be repeated in light
of the concrete case. In this context, the interpreter is the one who (1)
"reconstructs" the possibilities contained in the statute; (2) articulates
more precisely the contents of these possibilities; and (3) chooses the
combination of possibilities that corresponds most closely to the legally-
relevant features of the life case (which also must be interpreted). Thus
the interpreter's productivity consists in recognizing a legal provision as
referring to a type of conduct-for example, as recognizing that the
statutory signs "exceeding the speed limit" refer to, inter alia, a type of
behavior known as driving a car too fast through a town. The
interpreter's choosing and valuing the type of conduct as such means
that she connects it as the most appropriate type, with regard to its
contents, vis-A-vis the characteristics of the concrete life case. Moreover,
the decisionmaker has decided the case just this way, and this means that
it is the decisionmaker, and not the "statutory text," who has excluded
the possibility of any other legal solution.33
32. See Gustav Radbruch, Einflthrung in die Rechtswissenschaft 243 (9th rev. ed. 1958).
33. Continuing the example given in this paragraph, the decisionmaker's choice may exclude the
possibility that driving too fast is justified by self-defense, as well as the possibility that it is
excused by a state of emergency.
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D. Between the Normative Starting Point and the Factual Starting
Point: The Significance of What Is Typical, Normal, and Average
In summary, the theory of normative concretization of the statute
holds that the normative state of facts and the relevant factual state are
the products of a mutual valuation-of the normative starting point in
view of the factual one, and of the factual starting point in view of the
normative one. The important question that now emerges is how this
dialectical path can be examined and provided with meaning. For
example, are the normative and the factual starting points of deciding of
equal importance? Is reasoning carried out via a typical norm (a
paradigm case) that mediates and connects both levels? Is there present
in the decisionmaker (consciously or unconsciously) a preconception or
precomprehension that makes the connection of the normative and the
factual possible? Does the nature of things as tertium comparationis
show itself when and where the normative and the factual starting points
correspond?34 Is it enough to posit the possibility of decisionmaking
based on equitable principles, or even a sense of justice, that would fill
up the space between the premises? Does a conscious -value synthesis
necessarily accompany every legal decision? All of these questions
overlap to a certain extent, and the differences between them sometimes
depend more on the way they are emphasized than on their contents. The
nuances among them are not unimportant, however: whether we take a
particular legal decision to be the result of a mechanical "application of
law," or to be the consequence of intellectually responsible lawyering,
ultimately depends on these and kindred questions, and on the answers
we give them.
This much is clear and binding: the connection between the normative
state of facts and the relevant factual state in a concrete case is made by
a real human being who makes a "value movement to-and-fro," '3 as it
34. In conventional philosophical discourse, a "tertiary quality" is a property that depends on
some other property. See A.R Lacey, A Dictionary of Philosophy 41-42 (2d ed. 1976). The
question in the text borrows this usage to ask whether the primary property of the normative and
the factual states corresponding to one another brings forth some tertiary quality-for example, the
"correctness" of the decision-that would then show itself to the rational mind. See Kaufinarn,
supra note 11, at 36.
35. Cf Engisch, supra note 16, at 14-15 ("Fr den Obersatz ist wesentlich was auf den
konkreten Fall Bezug hat, am konkreten Fall ist wesentlich, was auf den Obersatz Bezug hat. Sieht
man aber rther zu, so handelt es sich nur urn eine standige Wechselwirkung, ein Hin- und
Herwandern des Blickes zwischen Obersatz und Lebenssachverhalt, nicht dagegen urn einem
fehlerhaften Zirkel.") (emphasis added) [Editor's translation: For the upper premise is essentially
what concerns the concrete case, and for the concrete case is essentially what concerns the upper
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were, between these two poles. This mutual valuation of the factual and
normative states does not merely reproduce what has been done before,
but also contains productive elements of its own. At the very least it is
productive in recognizing the life case as a factual state and a group of
legal provisions as the relevant normative state. As soon as they have
been identified, they have also been connected to one another, and
therefore the possibility of other legal connections has been excluded.
But now an important new element emerges: although the choice of
possibility in a particular case depends on a concrete human valuation of
the life case and of the statute, within this framework the legal decision
itself, as the product of the valuation, is generally qualified in its
expression to correspond to what is considered typical, normal, and
average by the audience of the statute.
It is the task of legal theory, legal dogmatics, and legal practice to
make operative the "typical conduct" and the "typical cases" that serve
as a connection between the two starting points of deciding. By this
means legal decisionmaking acquires a solid basis in what is taken to be
average-and this, in turn, serves as a precondition of the predictable
and equal treatment of legal subjects. Yet this is not enough: even if
typical cases and typical norms are very elaborate, their typicalness lies
at a level of abstraction that is always more or less above the
unrepeatable individuality of the life case. This is why it is always
necessary to state the arguments justifying the decisionmaker's choice of
the type of conduct to which the life case corresponds. Otherwise the
typical case or some other similar "objective starting point" might be
transparent as a criterion that binds no one, and that offers itself merely
as a set of symbols that can be manipulated. In the absence of this
insight, argumentative theory degenerates into a so-called "discursive
technique," which is always blind if it is not based on an appropriatetheoretical-legal starting point.3 6 Likewise, any adequate theory of
rational legal reasoning37 must be based on certain prerequisites-for
example, human dignity, basic rights and duties, the separation of
powers, and the rule of law-the contents of which must have already
become realized, or at least are immanent, in the world we live in."
premise. Examined more closely, this is actually a permanent exchange, a to-and-fro between
views of the upper premise and of the life facts of the case, and is not a logically flawed circle].
36. Consider Kant's statement that thoughts without contents are empty, and insights without
concepts are blind. See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunfi, in 3 Immanuel Kant
Werkausgabe 98 (Wilhelm von Weischedel ed., 2d ed. 1990).
37. Cf Alexy, supra note 16, at 361.
38. See Pavdnik, supra note 15, at 144.
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E. The Significance of the So-Called "Legal Syllogism"
In light of what has already been said, the concept of the "legal
syllogism" acquires a significance in the theory of argumentation that is
different from the one it has in purely conceptual jurisprudence. The
theory of argumentation strictly distinguishes between the starting points
of deciding, the formation of both premises of syllogistic inference, the
syllogistic conclusion itself, and the explanation stating legal reasons for
the decision in a concrete case. Thus the "legal syllogism" is only a
stage in the process of deciding-an important link, to be sure, but one
that cannot replace the persuasiveness and justifiability of the legal
decision as to its contents.
It is a separate question how legal deciding "really" takes place at a
particular place and time, and how this or that particular decisionmaker
arrives at the premises that logically entail the conclusion. All that can
be recognized from the outside is the legal decision itself, together with
the explanation that is offered to justify it. It is within this explanation
that the syllogistic form is to be found, as the framework into which both
premises must be placed. Of course, the modem conception of the Rule
of Law requires that the major premise contain a general and abstract
legal norm that in form deals equally and impartially with all relevant
factual states-for example, all drivers of cars who go too fast in town,
and not just this driver. Yet this is only a framework, and it remains to
be filled up by the decisionmaker with legally persuasive arguments
concerning the formation of the premises and their mutual connection.
One might say that the syllogistic form "requests" the decisionmaker to
act rationally-that is, to check whether the premises are legally
persuasive (justified) and to state valid arguments justifying the
decision.
F. Substantiation of the Legal Decision with Regard to Its Contents
and Not Just Its Form
A majority standpoint within conventional European legal thought is
that a decision is at least formally inside a "legal" framework if it is
formed within both starting points: within the life case as the object of
deciding, and within the formal legal sources (the statute) as the
normative starting point.39 One moves inside the contours of the life case
39. See, e.g., Engisch, supra note 16; Hruschka, supra note 28; Joachim Hruschka, Das
Verstehen von Rechtstexten (1972); Larenz, supra note 9, at 266-98; Mfiller, supra note 16, at 121;
Wr6blewski, supra note 16, at 11-22.
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by defining the relevant factual state out of it and not out of something
else-that is, by staying within the limits of what has happened. In
judicial decisionmaking a special difficulty arises because it first has to
be established what the real situation (in the sense of the life case) is,
and what elements of it are being represented in court. It is a separate
question how rules of procedure and evidence influence the
establishment of the real situation, and how they set the pattern therefore
in advance by predetermining the ways that the life case can permissibly
become an object of demonstration. But quite apart from considerations
of procedure and evidence, one goes beyond the limits of the life case if
elements that are nowhere supported in reality are attributed to it, or if
its scope is only established by making it correspond to the "expected"
relevant factual state in the way that Procrustes made guests correspond
to his infamous bed.
The contents of a legal decision can only be justified by stating
persuasive arguments demonstrating how the factual and normative
states have been determined as to their meaning within the legal
framework, and how the legal consequence connected with the applied
normative state has been concretized. An optimum legal decision is
achieved when the factual state is subsumed under that normative state
to which legally-relevant facts correspond most closely.4" It lies in the
nature of the legal phenomenon that this solution must be typical,
normal, and average-typical in the sense of preformed kinds of
conduct, or in the sense of imaginary types if the kinds of conduct
themselves are unstable or only just emerging. The types must be
suitable for the "universal" audience for which the formal legal source is
intended, and not just for the audience that should be directly persuaded
by the legal decision (for example, the parties). To put it in an even more
definite manner: the typical audience of a formal legal source demands
as its criterion of the decision's "correctness" that the decision would
have been drawn up the same way by a rational legislator before whom
stood an indefinite number of cases of the same kind.41
40. See Furlan, supra note 11, at 46; Kaufiuann, supra note 11, at 18.
41. This is the so-called "Huber's formula" in the Swiss Civil Code. Schweizerisches
Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB] art. 1 (1907) (Switz.) ("(1) Das Gesetz findet auf alle Rechtsfragen
Anwendung, fir die es nach Wortlauf oder Auslegung eine Bestimmung enthalt. (2) Kann dem
Gezetze keine Vorschrift entnommen werden, so soil der Richter nach Gewohnheitsrecht und, wo
auch ein solches fehIt, nach der Regel entscheiden, die er als Gesetzgeber aufstellen warde. (3) Er
folgt dabei bewmhrter Lehre und Oberlieferung.") [Editor's translation: (1) The Law finds
application for all questions of iaw, for a determination is contained in the wording and
interpretation. (2) If one cannot gather direction from the Law, then the judge shall take into
account customary law, and, if this is unavailable, then decide on the rules, over which the judge is
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V. FROM THE NORMATIVE AND FACTUAL STARTING
POINTS TO THE LEGAL DECISION: ONE OR MORE
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS?
A. Neither "Hard" nor "Easy" Cases Exist
In many, even most, cases, legal deciding in concrete cases is notfelt
to be particularly difficult. The judge's or attorney's previous experience
and knowledge of legal practice, theory, and law allow the
decisionmaker to bring out the factual state relatively quickly, and then
to subsume it under the appropriate normative state of constituent
elements. Here the imputation of meaning to the starting points of legal
deciding takes on the aspect of everyday routine. But it would be wrong
and even dangerous to classify these cases as somehow "easy" at the
level of the ontological. Even the simplest case can become a "hard"
case if one of the elements of the legal decision changes. And vice versa,
cases that were "hard" in the beginning become "easy" and "normal"
when legal practice reacts to the challenge they present by forming a
cluster of precedents, which then become firmly established and
accepted as routine within the practice. A classic example is the problem
that larceny of electricity presented to European legal practice at the
beginning of this century. The problem centered around the definition of
those objects (called "movables") the theft of which entailed criminal
penalties under statutes that were enacted before the development of
electricity as a technology. In German judicial practice, the accepted
standpoint was that electricity did not belong to movables, and therefore
the legislature needed to enact the basis for a new criminal offense
("larceny of electricity");42 whereas in Dutch43 and prewar Yugoslavian"4
judicial practice electricity was defined from the beginning as belonging
to the category of movables, and hence the "larceny of electricity" was
treated as just another case of the preexisting criminal offense of
larceny.
One could say that one sign that a case is "hard" is the
decisionmaker's felt need to refer in the decision to the scope of
meaning of the normative state of constituent elements. As hallmarks of
a "hard" case one sees, for example: teleological reduction via restrictive
the established lawgiver. (3) The judge will follow established doctrine and traditions]. See also
Slovn. Judicial Statute arts. 2, 3, reprinted in 19 Official Gazette of Slovenia (1994).
42. See Engisch, supra note 16, at 46.
43. See Perelman, supra note 3, at 60.
44. See Metod Dolenc, Tolma kazenskemu zakonik-u kraljevine Jugoslavife 471-72 (1929).
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and extensive "interpretation," as well as the drawing of statutory
"analogies" to the case at hand. Furthermore, there can be those cases
that are "hard" because they refer to complex and composite life cases
where it is felt to be difficult to establish what the legally-relevant group
of facts is. And finally, concrete cases themselves may seem to be
simple from one perspective, but as life cases they are always unique,
individual, and unrepeatable; therefore a mere nuance can change the
meaning that the case would have if this nuance were not present."
Thus, if cases that were once felt to be "hard" can become "easy" by
means of the habituation of legal practice to precedent, "easy" cases can
become "hard" again by a shift in perspective as to their facts.
B. The Legally Persuasive Decision Instead of the "Best" Decision
Although a "hard" case is not a fixed and immutable entity, it still
raises the question whether it has only one right solution that the
decisionmaker can find and substantiate as such. For example, it is the
standpoint of the American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin that a
judge can construct the optimum solution of a case even in the absence
of an express legal norm that would make the case "easy" to decide. For
Dworkin, the judge's duty is to establish the rights of the parties as they
existed before the dispute and then to make a decision that is wholly
based on the rights thus established. To put it even more clearly, the
judge has no discretion to define a legal norm ex post facto and thereby
to define the rights of the parties themselves retroactively.' Dworkin
strongly opposes the latter possibility, and summons the ideal judge
Hercules to help him solve the dispute. Hercules' task is to discover the
rights of the parties and not to create new rights. As the title of
Dworkin's book says, for him it is a question of taking rights seriously.47
Of course, one reason Dworkin's theory is controversial is its value
starting point: the antiutilitarian liberal conception of human rights,
which takes rights as being prior to, and severed from, any criterion of
social duties or social welfare. But in the context of argumentation
theory, his assertion that even in a "hard" case it is possible to find one
45. For example, a testator might personally sign the will, but use a pseudonym, or just his
initials, or he might sign at the top of the first page instead of at the end of the will, or his hand
might be guided by somebody else. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 12-13 (2d ed. 1994). Or
consider a larceny that was committed at night (an exacerbating circumstance in Belgian criminal
law), yet in a well-lit casino. Perelman, supra note 3, at 53
46. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 81 (5th ed. 1987).
47. See id at 105-10.
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and only one correct solution (the "right-answer thesis") is even more
controversial. As should be evident from the path that this essay has
already followed, Dworkin's provocative standpoint cannot be accepted.
The right-answer thesis could only be accepted under the condition that
there was available to the decisionmaker a hierarchically-organized
catalogue of metarules that gave criteria for deciding (1) which
interpretation of the statute is the best and only acceptable one; (2)
which legally-relevant state of facts is the most typical expression of the
life case; and (3) which factual and normative states show the closest
correspondence. But this condition does not hold in the societies to
which Dworkin addresses his theory. Western societies are varied and
pluralistic as to their values, and whatever overall "systems" of values
they do have are not at all watertight. There exists in them no "proto-
norm," no deus ex machina who could, even hypothetically, cut the
Gordian knot of every life case and give to each one its single best
solution.4"
Nevertheless, serious and sincere efforts to articulate theories that
have as their goal the "ideal" or the "best solution" to legal problems
should be welcome to anyone who, like the author, regards legal
decisionmaking as a responsible intellectual activity. Such efforts
include, for example, theoretical constructs like the ideal speaking
situation (ideale Sprechsituation),49 the "universal audience" to whom a
solution is to be presented and who has to be persuaded of its legal
rightness, 0 and even Dworkin's ideal judge Hercules,"' who removes all
possible obstacles, clears up the situation; and puts everything in its
rightful place. In the lecture hall, in the chambers of a court, or when
one is grappling with a legal problem on one's own, such methods can
be great value as modes of work. Through them the decisionmaker can
be forced to confront the normative possibilities, to find out in the most
accurate way what "really happened," to listen with an open mind to
counterarguments as the decisionmaker moves back and forth between
48. For persuasive criticisms of Dworkin on this score, see Aamio, supra note 16, at 161-65,
and Claudia Bittner, Recht als interpretive Praxis: Zu Ronald Dworkins allgemeiner Theorie des
Rechts 215 (1988).
49. See Jirgen Habermas, Vorstudien und Erganzungen zur Theorie des Kommunikativen
Handelns 174 (1st ed. 1984).
50. See Chaim Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traitg de 1'argumentation: La nouvelle
rhgtorique 40-41 (3d ed. 1979); ef Pavdnik, supra note 15, at 139-4. 1.
51. Dworkin, supra note 46, at 105 ("[A] lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and
acumen.").
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the levels of the factual and the normative, and to express arguments
justifying why one solution was chosen rather than others.
C. What the Theory ofArgumentation Can Contribute
A theory of argumentation is sensible only if it is continuously
examined and reexamined. It can only be productive if it is aware that
legal decisionmaking is conditioned by history and implanted in a
particular cultural milieu, and therefore that both starting points of
deciding-the normative and the factual-are open as to their meaning.
A theory that is not aware of these limitations overlooks the fact that
every legal solution is also a decision by somebody, and that as a
decision it always entails a choice between two or more possibilities,
performances, or shades of meaning. In this sense, the decision can
never be just the realization or the establishment of a completely
preexisting solution. If someone does claim to have knowledge of such a
solution, this claim is but a precursor to the imposition of a particular,
and therefore contingent, system of values masquerading as objectively
absolute.52 Historical experience in Europe and elsewhere has proven
that the generalized tendency to impose such value systems does not
have much in common with human rights and human dignity.
The goal of the theory of argumentation cannot and should not be as
"high" as providing a foundation for a scheme of univocal solutions to
legal problems. It is not the task of the theory of argumentation to create
or even improve a system of values that would make possible univocal
deciding. On the contrary, argumentation theory describes legal
decisionmaking as a historical phenomenon, as a going-on in the here
and now-as legal deciding with fully-defined coordinates of time and
place. It can only bring to decisionmakers a vision of the nature and
structure of legal deciding, of the elements of which a legal decision
consists, and of the merely possible legal arguments that define the
context of legal deciding. It does not lie within its legitimate power to
offer answers to questions in particular life cases that have occurred or
will occur; but it does offer criteria for saying that a legal decision will
be more legally persuasive the more coherent are the connection
between the arguments on which it is based. On the other hand, the
theory of argumentation is also flexible enough to see that sometimes
the "best" decision in a case (for example, at the "borderline," where the
decisionmaker confronts two or more contradictory solutions) will not
52. See Aarnio, supra note 16, at 165.
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consist of an ordered series of arguments at all. In such a case, the main
emphasis will be put on the so-called "decisive" argument that breaks
new ground-for example, the decision may give the grounds for
damages for an altogether new kind of immaterial loss, and its degree of
decisiveness will depend on prevailing social trends, attitudes, and
beliefs. If such a decision lies within the legal framework that makes it
possible, and is at the same time in accordance with the range of values
(taking into account all variations and conflicts) that are accepted in
society, its persuasive power will be substantially greater than if it were
based on a predetermined and detailed system of values that falsely
offers itself as uncontroversial and absolute.
VI. LEGAL DECISIONMAKING AS A RESPONSIBLE
INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY
The most important contribution that the theory of argumentation
makes is its awareness of the complexity of the legal decisionmaking
process. One might say that the theory of argumentation is humble
before its object. This means that even the most elaborate theory of
argumentation cannot give an instant recipe to the decisiomaker for
dealing with the questions that arise in the act of deciding itself. How the
normative and factual states should be formed, when they should be held
to correspond, and what legal consequences can be derived therefrom: in
the last analysis, these questions can only be validly answered by the
author of the concrete legal decision itself-by the judge, the attorney,
the prosecutor, etcetera. These people are the ones who must work to
find the right decision and to substantiate that decision in such manner
that the audience of the statute or some other legal source (and not just
the immediate audience of the legal decision) can accept the decision as
legally well-founded and also as just within the limits of legal order.
From the perspective of the theory of argumentation, legal
decisionmaking can no longer "hide" behind a statute that justifies it in
an "incontestable," "irrefutable," and "universal" manner. Now the legal
decision emerges as a productive act in itself-one that sees itself as
required to explain how the inference between the normative and the
factual starting points was made, how the normative and the factual
states have been formed, why they have been connected it. just this way,
and why the legal consequence has been derived in the way that it has.
The factual starting point of deciding can be of any kind. The normative
starting point of deciding can be of any kind. But the connecting of the
one to the other, and the legal decision itself, are always responsible
human acts, ones that create law in the fullest sense of the word.
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